The president holds full executive power over the armed forces, and may delegate this authority to other persons or entities at will. The constitution does not privilege the armed forces over other state institutions and they do not have formal supra-constitutional rights, but nonetheless enjoy considerable autonomy due to their organic relationship with the ruling political order, represented by the president at its apex and reinforced by the special status within the military of the Ba’ath party that he also heads.

The defense minister, ad hoc committees, and informal processes revolving around the president play a significant role in determining defense policy and budgets, senior military appointments, and operational command and control. The Council of Ministers and Parliament are required to ratify the defense budget and defense-related legislation, but lack de facto power to propose or reject draft laws. The armed forces submit to the minister of defense insofar as he represents the president’s will, but also respond to other, informal chains of command. As deputy commander in chief, deputy prime minister, and senior official of the Ba’ath party, as well as an army officer by tradition, the minister of defense also plays a role in overseeing military planning, procurement, budgeting, and recruitment.

The Ministry of Defense is subject to the same procurement law as civilian entities and to similar audit by the Central Organization for Financial Control, although anecdotal evidence suggests these legal and regulatory frameworks are routinely violated with impunity. Discussion of defense affairs is prohibited by law and is punished under the guise of protecting national security in a country officially at war with the neighboring state of Israel. Pro-government militias that emerged during the conflict since 2011 are deemed to have legal standing as “additional forces established when the necessity arises” under the command of the armed forces, but for the most part have remained outside the normal chain of military command and outside sovereign control.

The military has the formal duty to protect the constitution and the state, but also has a de facto role in maintaining the ruling political order. This is demonstrated by the extensive official intermeshing of the dominant Ba’ath party within the armed forces structure and by the existence of parallel informal chains of command leading to the president. Further consequences of this organic relationship are the precedence of political loyalty over professional competence in command appointments, and the predominance of communal and clan ties in patterns of recruitment and assignment in the officer corps.

This has had severe effects on military corporate identity and cohesion, command and control, and operational capability and performance. It has also prevented rebuilding the armed forces beyond their core communal demographic following years of armed conflict. The perceived identity of interests between the armed forces and the ruling political order means that the minister of defense can represent both the will of the president and the corporate interests of the military.

The military has little or no systematic involvement in nondefense affairs. The same is broadly true of a small core of retired officers, whose loyalty is rewarded with appointments in local government, the civil service and diplomatic corps, and Parliament, but who do not influence public affairs on behalf of the military. Active duty military personnel enjoy most of the civil and political rights of other citizens, including the right to vote, but may not stand for office.

Government control over the military has eroded substantially, as foreign government actors exercise administrative, financial, and in some cases operational control over pro-government militias. These actors exert considerable influence in newly formed army corps integrating those militias, and even in some regular army units. Foreign interests also influence command appointments, highlighted by a vacant army chief of staff position since the beginning of 2018 and by frequent reshuffling of senior officers.

The armed forces do not routinely undertake public order missions in normal times, but they became the mainstay of the government response once the 2011 uprising evolved into a civil war. Previously, the structure and geographical deployment of the armed forces indirectly served a population control role, and military intelligence agencies routinely undertook domestic surveillance, investigation, and detention. The public order role of the military is based partly on a legal provision that allows the president at his sole discretion to place them on a war footing to confront internal threats, and on the provision designating law enforcement and internal security agencies as auxiliary forces under armed forces command.

There are no formal limitations on presidential prerogative or on the scope and duration of public order missions that may be undertaken by the military. In the ongoing conflict the military always heads local and regional security committees involving law enforcement and internal security agencies. Coordination is haphazard and ad hoc, resulting in duplication of effort and friction. Turf battles arise between the military on one side and law enforcement and internal security agencies on the other, and within each of these two sectors. This results in the mutual countermanding of each other’s orders, undermines their normal chains of command, and subverts policy directives issued by the government and even by the president. Pro-government militias also occasionally perform public order tasks independently of the military and of law enforcement and internal security agencies.

The armed forces do not have general rules of engagement or codes of conduct governing public order missions in normal times, and have conducted such missions during the ongoing conflict as normal combat operations under ad hoc command structures created for the purpose. Pro-government militias are nominally bound by the same rules and regulations as the regular military, but there is no evidence that these rules are enforced. The military’s wholesale involvement in the ongoing conflict has severely degraded its national defense capability and left it heavily reliant on continued support and direct intervention by foreign actors.