The military approaches nation building as a function of reasserting state authority and upholding the ruling political order. Compulsory military service made a modest contribution to social integration prior to the current conflict, but is now used mainly as a punitive tool of counterinsurgency. Middle class sons often pay an exemption fee or use personal connections to avoid service, contributing to a rise in university enrollment and the numbers of young male refugees.

The military enjoyed fairly high levels of social trust up to the 2011 uprising, despite widespread antipathy to the ruling political order and the perception of Alawi domination and favoritism in the armed forces, but a wide gap has emerged since. Large sectors of the population view the military with deep distrust, seeing it as acting on behalf of the ruling political order and of the minority Alawi community. This loss of trust extends to parts of the population regarded as loyal or obedient, which have refused to perform military service outside their home areas during the conflict. Others, especially in the Alawi community, see the military as more faithfully representing the country as a whole than those they regard as dissidents. Parts of the population highlight the military’s past role in suppressing insurrection by the Muslim Brotherhood, while others highlight its patriotic role in wars with Israel.

Official state media glorify the role and supposed achievements of the armed forces, but the participation of the armed forces in public relations campaigns or other efforts to shape or improve their public image remains limited. Prior to 2011, military careers were seen as an avenue for upward mobility and gaining influence, especially among Alawis and among Sunni Muslims in the provinces. The need for job security and manpower needs have pushed recruitment among Alawis to historic peaks since.

Discussion of the armed forces and defense affairs is prohibited by law, and may trigger reprisals. Pro-government social media in loyalist communities have nonetheless broken this ban on occasion, with public criticism of senior commanders and government officials for perceived failings and with demands to release reservists after ending tours of duty.

Military perceptions are largely governed by the question of political loyalty, rather than by deeply ingrained attitudes towards civilians. The armed forces regard themselves as an element of a ruling political order serving the national interest alongside civilian authorities, albeit exercising a special responsibility for physically defending the state and operating under a different chain of command. The predominant ethos is nationalist-republican, rather than one of service to society. This allows the rank and file of the armed forces to portray themselves as acting on behalf of the whole population, even while perceiving certain communities or social groups as politically suspect or unpatriotic.

The civil war has shown that the contrast between how society perceives the military and how the military perceives itself is often acute, and explains why Alawi military personnel, who predominate in career positions, see themselves as uniquely loyal to a collective Syrian national identity, rather than as monopolizing the military or state power. For the military, the expectation that it should be broadly socially representative is subordinate to political loyalty, which is seen as paramount for performing its national mission. Military enlistment policies are therefore geared to vetting attitudes towards the Ba’ath party rather than actively seeking social inclusion or geographic representation, contributing to the predominance of Alawis in the ranks.

There is little evidence that military personnel feel entitled to better pay, pensions, or other terms of service than civilians. State media portray the military in a highly positive light, but the armed forces do not undertake significant public relations efforts.

The hard separation between the military and civilian spheres means that the armed forces regard civil-military cooperation, and social and economic development more generally, as outside their remit. The military does not undertake civilian outreach, and lacks a dedicated civil-military cooperation doctrine or staff. Military education curricula include a limited range of courses on civil affairs, but these are undervalued and do not feed into routine consultation or coordination with civilian actors. The armed forces have a Political Directorate that occasionally conducts public campaigns and meetings, but this is unrelated to civil-military cooperation.