The constitution does not privilege the armed forces in any way, simply stating their mission as “defending the nation’s territory and sovereignty, serving the interests of the Syrian people, [and] protecting their goals and national security.” As a state institution headed by a cabinet minister, the SAAF falls nominally under government authority, but in practice and in law the president of the republic exercises effective command and control. He is the principal source of defense-related legislation, with power to declare war, announce a general mobilization, sign peace treaties, declare a state of emergency, and make senior command appointments. The president also makes key defense policy decisions on military deployments, arms purchases, promotions and transfers, demobilizations, and rules of engagement, with input from the Military Defense Council that he heads, just as the National Security Office plays an important role in coordinating the role of intelligence agencies.
Civilian authorities are marginal in defense affairs. Parliament approves the defense budget, but only as a single line item, and neither the Ministry of Finance nor public auditing agencies are empowered to examine it. Neither the parliamentary National Security Committee nor any of its members dare question defense officials, and the defense minister, who is always an army officer, acts as a representative of the president rather than of the government.

The minister of defense and other senior security officials mediate the command relationship between the president and the SAAF. The president’s role as secretary-general of the Ba'ath party complements this relationship. The Political Directorate of the Ministry of Defense implants party ideology throughout internal publications and maintains branches in all military units down to company level. Party ideology is prominent in military education. This party structure frames coordination with internal security and law enforcement agencies, which are sometimes designated as “auxiliary forces” to the SAAF.

SAAF Command has formal control over the regular army, but generally lacks effective control over the numerous loyalist militias that have emerged in the course of the civil war, even though legally these are “additional forces” under its nominal authority. Instead, the president wields overarching military and security authority. He exercises overriding control through a special military office attached to the presidency and through informal, parallel networks within the SAAF.

Russia and Iran have also exerted considerable influence over the defense sector since the start of the civil war. They exercise direct administrative and operational control over a number of pro-government militias, including some that have been reorganized into formations nominally under SAAF Command. The existence of the autonomous Syrian Democratic Forces and of Turkish-backed anti-government armed groups further fragments and contests the provision of security by the central government.

The structure of authority centered on the president and the Ba'ath party excludes civilian agencies from playing a role in defense affairs, but also ensures that the SAAF’s only policymaking role is in the defense domain. The SAAF has played a command role in public order missions in the ongoing civil war, during which military courts have exercised extensive jurisdiction over civilians. The SAAF has otherwise avoided involvement in tasks that lie within the Ministry of Interior’s jurisdiction.

The armed forces are obedient to the ruling political order, comprising the president, his inner circle, and the Ba'ath party. The party directs the SAAF’s political administration, delivers ideological training in military schools. Senior SAAF officers also sit on the party’s Central Command and Central Committee. Military schools vet applicants for political loyalty, and most military officers join the party. Command appointments recognize professional competence, but political loyalty and social identity play a considerable role.

An estimated 90 percent of career military personnel belong to the Alawi community, an offshoot of Shia Islam. The officer corps is factionalized along communal and personal loyalty lines, resulting in informal networks that bypass formal command structures. Russian and Iranian influence adds complexity to these dynamics. The salience of communal identities and clan ties accounts for the SAAF’s cohesion and enduring obedience to presidential orders.

The SAAF’s survival is integral to the survival of the political order, with the president at its apex. Civilian political actors outside the Ba'ath party cannot penetrate the SAAF, and the SAAF does not intervene in politics. This explains how the SAAF has coexisted with pro-government militias that do not fall under its effective control, even though these militias constitute “additional” forces legally under its command. The continuing challenge posed by autonomous and anti-government armed groups to the ruling political order reinforces the need to maintain an integral relationship with the military as the principal means of dominating national politics.

Military culture does not inculcate subordination to civilian authority or the rule of law, nor does it emphasize values of citizen’s rights or political pluralism. The SAAF does not deliver public goods or services outside its defense remit, and officers are rarely rewarded with appointments in the civilian state bureaucracy after retirement. A small number of retirees hold important positions in local government, based on security or social considerations, perpetuating presidential power rather than extending the military’s institutional influence.

The ruling political order provides a framework for cooperation and coordination between the Ministry of Defense and the SAAF, on one side, and the Ministry of Interior and its subordinate police forces and internal security agencies, on the other. Jurisdictions and spheres of operation are relatively distinct, but the SAAF is the dominant partner. Syria’s various intelligence agencies frequently duplicate efforts and encroach on each other’s missions nonetheless. The involvement of both military units and security agencies in the war economy also generates rivalry on the ground and impedes the implementation of policy directives.

Perceptions of the military contrast sharply across Syrian society. Large portions of the population see it as politically partisan, but others, especially in the Alawi community, regard it as upholding national sovereignty. The military sees its defense of the ruling political order as integral to serving the state and embodying national identity. The SAAF does not restrict public debate, except in defense affairs, but loyalist social media have complained openly of perceived failings and unpopular measures by the Ministry of Defense and SAAF commanders.

Civilian authorities have no role in developing or monitoring implementation of the defense budget, and only a limited role in approving it. The Ministry of Defense prepares a budget reflecting the needs of all bodies under its jurisdiction, with input from the SAAF. The Council of Ministers and Parliament approve this budget as a single line item, without access to its details. Civilian authorities do not have access to details of foreign military assistance to Syria, although debt repayments are known to have been charged to the general state budget. Only the president, as commander in chief, has the power to approve and amend the budget, make new allocations, or exercise oversight.

Actual defense spending has deviated from the approved budgets because of combat needs, fluctuating exchange rates, and increases in military salaries and pensions during the ongoing civil war. Russia and Iran bear some of these costs, but all costs, including foreign military debt, appear to be reflected in the official defense budget. External civilian agencies do not audit military accounts, except for the administrative budget of the Ministry of Defense, and the law prohibits public discussion of the defense budget. An internal military inspection panel monitors SAAF spending, and the Military Intelligence Section is informed of any audits or corruption.

The military is not known to control discretionary funds, but it manages several economic enterprises that provide construction, medical, and limited manufacturing and retail services. Their combined revenue is modest, and is reported in the defense budget. In contrast, the scale of illicit income generation is considerable. Officers invest in commercial projects, take bribes to award promotions and transfers, sell fuel and military materiel on the black market, and derive illegal earnings from protecting illegal trade and smuggling. These practices are longstanding, but the ongoing civil war has offered new opportunities for extortion at checkpoints, looting of private homes and enterprises, and ransom- and bribe-taking. Income-generating activities by loyalist militias, anti-government armed groups, and the autonomous administration in the northeast weaken government revenue and its ability to plan or enforce economic policies.

The military does not influence economic policymaking, nor is it known to lobby for or against specific policies. Military personnel or their families have complained publicly during the ongoing civil war about the inadequacy of pay, pensions, and compensation for death or injury. But this has not translated into open opposition among individual personnel or from the military to the government’s economic or social policies.

The military has not added significant value to the economy, apart from its contribution to domestic consumption, but has played a substantial role as an employer and a source of household survival. Social security and health insurance for military personnel are commensurate with those for the public sector, and generous in comparison to the private sector. A series of increases since 2011 has ensured that military pay and pensions have risen at a faster rate than those of the civil service, but increases have failed to keep up with the severe depreciation in purchasing power.

The unambiguous subordination of the armed forces to the president facilitates decisionmaking, but the exclusion of the rest of the executive branch, the prevalence of informal networks and parallel reporting structures, and the minimal planning capacity of the Ministry of Defense greatly reduce policy coherence, impede military readiness and effectiveness, and produce suboptimal national defense outcomes. Extensive politicization of the armed forces exacerbates factionalism in the officer corps, further impeding professional development, distorting performance incentives, and undermining command and control. Extensive reliance on parallel networks and micromanagement of the defense sector further weaken the cohesion of the armed forces and block systemic monitoring and evaluation.

The SAAF has held together and achieved battlefield success on multiple fronts, despite these organizational challenges and losing two-thirds of its strength at the beginning of the civil war. It has also displayed low initiative, poor ability to conduct combined arms operations, and a general reluctance to undertake offensive actions. The SAAF has suffered heavy casualties due to poor training and inadequate gear, and equally heavy attrition of combat equipment due to poor maintenance and weak recovery and repair capabilities. It cannot deter frequent Israeli air attacks or the deployment of U.S. and Turkish troops across national territory, or prevent the reappearance of armed opposition in the south.

Management of the defense burden is inefficient. Defense spending has grown as state finances have contracted. The preference for maintaining a large military prior to 2011 precluded modernization, and maintaining political control during the subsequent war has frustrated lesson learning and cost-benefit assessments. The result is using firepower in ways that displaces populations and destroys vital infrastructure that the government needs to rebuild the country, and an inability to translate ad hoc tactical innovations such as mixed-unit task forces into doctrinal or structural adaptations.

SAAF structure is inefficient. The SAAF must coexist with numerous pro-government militias that come nominally under its command, but which are in fact controlled by other loyalist bodies, or by Russia and Iran. These allies shoulder the financial costs of militias they establish, but this leaves the Syrian government with a command and control problem and a future burden of demobilizing and reintegrating militiamen. Effective command and control relies on informal procedures. A special military office in the presidential palace routinely bypasses SAAF Command to direct deployments and operations.

Civilian authorities lack competences that could help manage defense resources and assist in developing capabilities. This deprives the military of potential expertise in strategic planning, lesson learning, military education, and technical and professional skills. The SAAF is unable to reduce human and material losses and mobilize resources, and the Ministry of Defense has been compelled to pledge that conscripts will serve in their home regions, to defuse opposition from local communities. Women mainly perform medical and clerical roles, and garrison or neighborhood protection roles. These limitations reflect an institutional mindset that minimizes absorption of foreign defense expertise and training.