The organization and operational capability of the armed forces are largely a legacy of Soviet models of warfare and past armed conflict with Israel, both of which compelled professional assessments of defense needs. However, the primacy of maintaining political control within the armed forces and the country as a whole currently has a greater impact on the design, management, and development of military capabilities. These are handled almost entirely by the president and a small coterie of defense officials, advisors, and select commanders on the Military Defense Council. Allied governments provide separate input, but often work at cross purposes.

The institutional mechanisms for the conduct of defense reviews are similarly absent or non-functional. The striving for political control also dictates policies and priorities in defense affairs, such as retention of compulsory military service. Policies and priorities also reflect the social alliances of the ruling order. Personal, family, clan, and communal ties play a major role in recruitment and appointments. Clear rules and procedures exist on paper, but actual processes are opaque and unpredictable. Consequently, nepotism, corruption, and other discretionary practices are pervasive.

Coup-proofing strategies and the pervasiveness of patronage networks encourage the emergence of informal fiefdoms within the Ministry of Defense and armed forces, and incentivize rivalry. This blocks processes necessary to enhance professionalism and to upgrade institutional capacity and operational capability. The formal structure of the armed forces command serves defense needs, but real authority lies to a considerable degree in informal networks that provide a parallel structure of command and control leading ultimately to the president.

Numerous state-sponsored military formations that appeared in the course of the ongoing armed conflict come nominally under the command of the Ministry of Defense and the general staff of the armed forces, but exercise considerable autonomy in reality. The armed forces have virtually no administrative authority or operational command over the sizeable Syrian militias formed with Russian or Iranian support, nor over militias consisting of foreign nationals fielded by Iran or forces belonging to the Lebanese Hezbollah. Both Russia and Iran wield considerable influence over defense affairs and military development, and play a major role in providing technical training and combat support, but lack the leverage to drive systemic changes or reforms.

During the ongoing civil war, the armed forces have displayed starkly contradictory levels of military corporate identity and institutional cohesion, reflected in extremely high rates of defection, desertion, and no-shows among Sunni Muslim enlisted personnel and conscripts, especially in the first year of the conflict. In contrast, the regular core of the armed forces, comprising the bulk of the officer corps and enlisted personnel, displayed much higher cohesion. Driving this was the military’s close intertwining with the political order, material incentives such as officer housing, intimidation, and heavy reliance on Alawi recruits. Despite remaining loyal to the chain of command and the government, this core continues to exhibit poor motivation, initiative, and performance.

The perceived legitimacy of missions and legality of orders derive from existential communal fears, political partisanship, and fear of punishment. Individual or communal norms govern behavior, rather than institutional codes of military ethics or international humanitarian law, to which Syria is a signatory. Informal quotas based on communal identity and clan affiliation shape command appointments, and officers perceive professional merit as less important than personal and political loyalty in career advancement. These factors create parallel relationships of influence that are reinforced by intelligence agencies and Ba’ath party commissars. This accounts for the perception that benefits, promotions, and assignments are awarded at the discretion of commanders, fomenting favoritism and corruption and discouraging complaints, but also creating a personal stake for military personnel to remain loyal.

The armed forces accept civilian authority, but in practice do not come under the direct or effective control of any civilian body other than the presidency. Military personnel generally regard their pay and pensions as better than civil service counterparts, as corresponding to terms of service, albeit not competitive with other civilians, but may believe that pro-government militias enjoy better terms of service. Among foreign partners, Russia has endorsed compliance by Syrian officers with internal rules and regulations by reducing sectarianism in the armed forces as a means of enhancing battlefield effectiveness, but lacks the leverage to ensure that such measures are implemented.

The military and civilian justice systems are formally separate, but civilians may be tried in military courts for a range of offenses. Military personnel may not be tried in civilian courts, even if civilians are involved as plaintiffs or defendants. The de jure and de facto jurisdiction of the military justice system has grown considerably during the ongoing conflict, with civilians routinely tried in military courts and field tribunals that lack due process and impartiality.

Pro-government militias are nominally bound by standard military regulations, but in practice resort to arbitrary detention and summary justice. Special security courts try terrorism cases, which encompasses political charges. The military penal code provides judicial review, although in practice military personnel act with impunity towards civilians.

The military justice system has broad scope in deciding where to try civilians and military personnel, and may bring charges of damaging army morale against civilians who accuse soldiers of criminal offenses. Rules of engagement are weak or disregarded and the armed forces are accused of committing war crimes, including the use of chemical weapons against civilians. No code of conduct towards civilians is known to exist. Ethical inhibitions are similarly weak, as the salience of corruption, nepotism, and communalism in the organizational culture of the armed forces undermines the rule of law and creates a permissive environment for human rights violations.

International legal controls on the conduct of war are not embedded in military training, and the armed forces lack monitoring mechanisms to ensure compliance. Syria is not a signatory to the Geneva Convention Additional Protocol II requiring protection for victims of internal armed conflicts, and does not partner with the International Committee of the Red Cross for training. Russia has occasionally sought to curb violations of legal norms and codes by deploying Russian military police in select locations, but this appears to be a secondary concern.

Formal criteria for entry to military schools are skewed by profiling applicants for political loyalty and communal identity, and by nepotism and corruption. Recruitment from the Alawi community has intensified during the ongoing conflict, with recruits viewing military employment as a means to job security in a devastated economy. Officers perceive that personal connections and communal identity have a greater impact on career advancement than military education, creating a disincentive against acquiring relevant skills and knowledge. Mandatory political indoctrination courses delivered by the Ba’ath party reinforce this perception, as does the distribution of cadets among coveted military schools in accordance with perceived loyalty rather than educational attainment.

The Higher Military Academy provides advanced education at its staff and war colleges, and senior officers and civilian officials jointly attend National Defense College courses. Officers are sent on study abroad missions, but this is as much a means of patronage and reinforcing ties with allies as an investment in professional development. Curricula emphasize subordination to the civilian authorities headed by the president and represented by the Ba’ath party, rather than respect for civilian values and authority as such.

Corporate identity and initiative are undervalued, reducing the positive potential impacts of military education on shaping career expectations and cementing institutional cohesion. Expertise is sought from nonmilitary sources in limited spheres, including administration, electronic warfare, and certain engineering skills. Engineering and technical qualifications acquired during military training and service serve personnel returning to civilian life, but the armed forces do not run programs designed specifically to equip them with transferable skills for this purpose.