DOMAINS
Indicators
The Index measures the relative efficiency of civil-military relations. Efficiency is defined as the ability of civilian and military actors to negotiate, formulate, and coordinate policies in the sphere of national defense, in ways that further effective governance of the defense sector, reinforce state core competences, and enhance nation building.
The Index includes five domains, each comprising a set of main questions and indicators. Rationales for each domain and main question clarify their relevance in measuring the efficiency of civil-military relations. The index is designed in question format, allowing respondents to answer each indicator on a scale.
The Index includes five domains, each comprising a set of main questions and indicators. Rationales for each domain and main question clarify their relevance in measuring the efficiency of civil-military relations. The index is designed in question format, allowing respondents to answer each indicator on a scale.
Military Professionalism
Efficient civil-military relations facilitate the development of professional military competences, ensuring the military has a unique body of military knowledge, professional entry requirements, strong corporate identity and cohesion, and an ethos of serving society.
Q1. What weighs more heavily in shaping the organization and operational capability of the national armed forces: professional assessment of defense needs or political factors?
If partisan political considerations exert more weight in determining military capabilities and organization, they can limit professionalism and effectiveness of the armed forces, while bringing their cohesion, political neutrality, and social inclusiveness into question.
- Does the civil-military relationship enable properly designed and effectively managed programs for the development of military capabilities (including doctrine, organization, training, leadership, personnel, and facilities and infrastructure)?
- Institutional mechanisms to review and discuss military capabilities and needs are absent or non-functional, relevant specialized civilian agencies (such as the Ministry of Finance) are excluded or marginalized, the military avoid or block the involvement of relevant or competent civilian authorities, or political contests among civilian actors disrupt proper discussion of defense needs. The relationship is not conducive to a joint or integrated approach to defense needs.
- The military does not block the involvement of relevant or competent civilian authorities but institutional mechanisms are under-developed or not routinized effectively, and relevant specialized civilian agencies are not effectively integrated into the review and discussion of defense needs.
- The relationship functions due to the integration of the military within the ruling political order, which provides institutional mechanisms and/or routine, predictable channels to review and discuss defense needs, but is dependent (i.e. the relationship is) on the stability of the political order.
- Institutional mechanisms are developed and functional, relevant specialized civilian agencies (such as the Ministry of Finance) contribute as needed, the military engage with relevant or competent civilian authorities, and the relationship is protected from political contests in the civilian domain. There is a joint, integrated approach to defense needs.
- Does the civil-military relationship enable properly designed and effectively managed strategic defense reviews to reassess needs and address gaps in policy, doctrine, or military capabilities, in response to inadequate performance or to meet emerging trends and new threats?
- No: Civilian authorities lack the competence and political will to assert their role or make an effective contribution, and the military lacks readiness to engage these authorities and to exercise accountability for performance. Neither the methodology nor the institutional mechanisms exist to conduct meaningful strategic defense reviews and act on findings.
- A narrow circle of the country’s political leadership is involved, enabling some form of strategic review, but this excludes other civilian agencies. The methodology and institutional mechanisms to conduct strategic defense reviews exist to a limited extent, but resistance to reviews seriously impedes implementing findings and recommendations.
- The civil-military relationship allows discussion of needs, trends, and threats, but the methodology and institutional mechanisms to conduct strategic defense reviews remain under-developed, impeding effective lesson learning, forecasting, and follow-up.
- Yes: The relevant civilian authorities have the competence and political will and the military accepts to engage with them and to exercise accountability for its performance. They have clear and effective institutional mechanisms and methodology to conduct strategic defense reviews, resulting in useful assessments on which meaningful recommendations may be developed and implemented.
- To what extent do the design and management of military capabilities reflect national defense needs as opposed to the partisan political agendas or social alliances of governing actors?
- Partisan political agendas or social alliances are an over-riding factor to the detriment of defense needs.
- Defense needs are met but partisan political agendas or social alliances may outweigh them.
- Partisan political agendas or social alliances are taken into account, but not in a way that undermines defense needs.
- To a great extent: defense needs are the defining factor, and partisan political agendas or social alliances play a minimal role.
- How far do personal, family, or communal ties affect command and control of the armed forces?
- Strong effect: personal, family, or communal ties shape command and control of the armed forces.
- Some effect: personal, family, or communal ties affect command and control, but these are also balanced with professional considerations.
- Minor effect: professional considerations come first, but personal, family, or communal ties have some effect.
- No effect.
- Do parallel state-sponsored military formations exist that were formed independently and not come under the command of the Ministry of Defense or the General Staff of the Armed Forces?
- Powerful parallel state-sponsored armed forces were formed independently and remain outside the command of the Ministry of Defense or the General Staff of the Armed Forces.
- Parallel state-sponsored military formations are placed nominally under the command of the Ministry of Defense or the General Staff of the Armed Forces, but are largely autonomous in reality.
- Parallel state-sponsored military formations have been placed under the effective command of the Ministry of Defense or the General Staff of the Armed Forces.
- No independently formed, parallel state-sponsored military formations exist.
- Is the military chain of command structured primarily to serve defense needs or to assure political control?
- Heavily oriented towards ensuring political control and coup-proofing.
- Defense needs are addressed but political considerations are more important.
- Defense needs are more important than political considerations but the latter are also a factor.
- Defense needs are unambiguously foremost, political considerations play a minimal role.
- Is there a clear and transparent system for human resources planning, recruitment, and career development of military personnel?
- The system for recruitment, promotion, and development is poorly institutionalized, being marked by high levels of opacity, unpredictability, favoritism and other discretionary practices, or corruption.
- The system is in place, but is not applied methodically and equitably for all military branches, units, or personnel, and does not fulfill its purpose.
- The system is institutionalized, but needs improvement to standardize application of criteria and reviews and raise its effectiveness.
- The human resources system is institutionalized, with central evaluation boards for officers, standardized assessment methods for noncommissioned officers, documented evaluations, written job descriptions and terms of engagement.
- How willing is the defense sector to accept advice from foreign providers of military assistance for improving systemic functions (such as planning, oversight and evaluation, and data management), as distinct from hardware or technical training?
- Not willing at all.
- Generally unwilling to accept advice, except in a few areas only.
- Somewhat willing to accept advice, but selective in implementation.
- Generally willing to accept advice from foreign providers of assistance, and to design implementation plans.
Q2. How well bound is the military by a professional ethic?
Formal and informal factors enhance the military’s professional competence, reinforce its institutional identity and cohesiveness, and anchor its commitment to upholding legal norms and defending society over political connections.
- How strong and dependable is the military’s corporate identity and institutional cohesion in the face of political or social challenges?
- Weak corporate identity and low institutional cohesion, raising the risk of disobedience or fracturing in the face of political or social challenges.
- Weak corporate identity or institutional cohesion, but political or financial factors mitigate the risk of disobedience or fracturing.
- Relatively strong corporate identity but institutional cohesion still vulnerable to major political and social challenges.
- Strong corporate identity and dependable institutional cohesion, enabling the military to face political and social challenges.
- How important is the perception that missions and operational orders are legitimate to the willingness of the military to obey?
- Not important at all: Cooptation by the ruling regime, fear of consequences, and/or political or social polarization motivate the military to obey orders that violate military ethics and international humanitarian law or protocols to which the country is signatory. This applies to all branches of service and rank and files.
- Of limited importance: The perception of legitimacy is shaped by political or social partisanship rather than ethical or legal norms, but the military may still moderate its behavior to observe the latter while implementing missions and operational orders. This may vary across branches of service and rank and files.
- Somewhat important: The perception of legitimacy is influenced by political or social partisanship but there is awareness of and an effort to comply with ethical or legal norms. This normally applies across branches of service and rank and files, with some variation.
- Highly important: The perception of legitimacy is based primarily on ethical or legal norms, and political or social partisanship is viewed as negative. This applies to all branches of service and rank and files.
- How important is professional merit compared to personal, political, or communal loyalties in command appointments and officer promotions?
- Not important: Personal, political, or communal loyalties routinely outweigh professional merit in appointments and promotions.
- Of limited importance: Personal, political, or communal loyalties are influential, but professional merit is also taken into account, though not prioritized.
- Somewhat important: Professional merit largely determines appointments and promotions, although personal, political, or communal loyalties are considered.
- Highly important: Professional merit determines command appointments and promotions regardless of loyalties.
- To what extent is the formal military hierarchy (rank and files and chain of command) influenced by parallel loyalties?
- The formal military hierarchy is heavily influenced by parallel loyalties.
- The formal military hierarchy is somewhat influenced by parallel loyalties.
- The formal military hierarchy is observed in most respects, with some influence by parallel loyalties.
- To a great extent: the formal military hierarchy is observed as a matter of course.
- How significant are perceptions within the armed forces of bias or inequality regarding terms of service (pay, promotion, missions)?
- High significance: Perceptions of bias seriously undermine cohesion and loyalty.
- Some significance: Some concerns and perceptions of bias and inequality affect cohesion and loyalty.
- Limited significance: Perceptions of bias and inequality are minor and have limited impact.
- No significance: Cohesion and loyalty are not affected by perceptions of bias or inequality.
- Does the military generally regard civilian authorities as competent, patriotic, and deserving of obedience?
- No, the military generally distrusts the competency and patriotism of civilian authorities and may reject subordination to them, or even assert its own political influence or control.
- The military asserts its autonomy in defense affairs and rejects civilian authority in related fields of competence.
- The military accepts civilian authority in related fields of competence, but autonomously assesses civilian orders before obeying.
- The military considers civilian authorities as competent, patriotic, and deserving of obedience.
- Do the military rank and file generally regard their conditions of service (including pay and pensions) as equitable compared to those of the civil service, and competitive with those of civilians generally?
- The military rank and file regard their conditions of service as inequitable compared to those of civil service and highly noncompetitive with those of civilians generally.
- The military rank and file regard their conditions of service as somewhat equitable compared to those of civil service, but noncompetitive with those civilians generally.
- The military rank and file regard their conditions of service as equitable or better compared to those of civil service, but noncompetitive with those of civilians generally.
- The military rank and file consider their conditions of service as equitable with those of civil service, and competitive with those of civilians generally.
- To what extent do providers of foreign military assistance promote professionalism across the board?
- Minimal or none: Providers of foreign military assistance do not prioritize promotion of professionalism or are perceived to behave in ways that undermine it.
- To a little extent: Providers of foreign military assistance promote professionalism in select branches or units of the military they favor, generating perceptions of bias and resentment among other branches or units.
- Moderate: Providers of foreign military assistance advocate professionalism generally but only invest in it in the sectors of the military that they work with.
- Considerable: Providers of foreign military assistance actively promote professionalism through programs that develop central competences benefitting all branches or units of the military.
Q3. How well-defined, regulated, and transparent is the military justice system?
Military personnel are often subject to legal constraints that civilians are not, and may be exempt from prosecution in civil courts. But it helps to make civil-military relations more efficient when the military justice system holds military personnel accountable to the expectations of society, when the separate jurisdictions of the civilian and military justice systems are clearly defined and maintained, and there are effective provisions for judicial review.
- Is the separation between the jurisdiction of civilian and military courts clear and maintained in practice?
- No: The jurisdiction of military courts extends de jure or de facto into civilian domains, sometimes through the creation of special security courts, and military courts are routinely used to try civilians.
- Partially: Military and civilian justice systems are formally separate, but the jurisdiction of military courts is extended somewhat (whether directly or through special security courts).
- Considerably: The separation between the jurisdiction of civilian and military courts is clear and largely maintained in practice, but certain kinds of offenses are nonetheless delegated to the military justice system.
- Yes: The separation between the jurisdiction of civilian and military courts is clear and maintained.
- Are military personnel subject to the same civilian laws as citizens, in relation to their performance of non-military tasks and obligations?
- Military personnel are exempted de jure or de facto from prosecution in civilian courts even for civil or criminal matters.
- Military personnel may be subject to civilian law but this is largely at the discretion of military authorities.
- Military personnel are more routinely subject to civilian law in civil or criminal matters, but inconsistently.
- The subjection of military personnel to civilian courts in civil or criminal matters is well established and routinized.
- What role does judicial review play in military justice?
- Little or no role: military judges restrict themselves to applying the law in a way that does not challenge conventional thinking or the interests of the government.
- Somewhat unimportant role: military judges are mostly conservative in their interpretation of military codes, making little effort to define norms of professional military conduct.
- Somewhat important role: on occasion, military judges interpret military codes in ways that reinforce professional conduct and the rule of law.
- Significant role: military judges regularly interpret military codes to reinforce norms of professional military conduct and the rule of law.
- To what extent are rules of engagement both clear and enforced?
- Minimally or not at all: They are neither clear nor enforced consistently.
- To some extent: They are vague but occasionally enforced.
- To a greater extent: They are clear but not enforced consistently.
- Fully: They are both clear and enforced consistently.
- To what extent do informal notions of ethics and organizational culture reinforce or undermine adherence to legal and ethical norms?
- Minimally or not at all: Military culture encourages a culture of impunity that undermines adherence to legal and ethical norms.
- To some extent: Military culture contains some unwritten rules and notions of ethics, but does not actively maintain these nor reinforce adherence to legal and ethical norms, nor does it actively discourage impunity.
- To a greater extent: Military culture tends to encourage and maintain unwritten rules and notions of ethics that reinforce adherence to legal and ethical norms.
- Considerably: Military culture strongly reinforce adherence to legal and ethical norms.
- To what extent are legal controls on warfare and military behavior contained in international treaties and conventions to which the country is a signatory incorporated into military law, taught in military schools, and adhered to in practice (monitored and enforced through the chain of command)?
- Minimally and ineffectively: Legal controls on warfare are not incorporated into military law or taught in military schools, and are routinely ignored in practice at all command levels.
- To some extent: Legal controls on warfare are partially incorporated into military law or taught in military schools, but efforts and means to monitor and enforce them are inconsistent or lack credibility.
- To a greater extent: Legal controls on warfare are incorporated into military law and taught in military schools, and some effort is made to monitor and enforce them through the chain of command.
- Considerably: Legal controls on warfare are incorporated into military law and taught in military schools, and are adhered to systematically (monitored and enforced through the chain of command).
- Are there specific training programs relating to international humanitarian law, particularly in coordination with the International Committee of the Red Cross?
- No: Training in international humanitarian law is not conducted.
- Minimal: Training in international humanitarian law is conducted occasionally, but is merely nominal and has little practical impact.
- Moderate: Training in international humanitarian law is conducted routinely, but has inconsistent practical impact.
- Yes: Training in international humanitarian law is conducted routinely and has consistent and measurable practical impact.
- To what extent do providers of foreign military assistance reinforce or undermine military adherence to human rights and other legal codes of conduct or rules of engagement?
- Minimally and ineffectively.
- To some extent.
- To a greater extent.
- Considerably.
Q4. Is military education conducive to professional development and performance and to stable civil-military relations?
Civil-military relations are more efficient when military education is seen to enhance performance and career advancement, helps develop the military’s corporate identity and institutional cohesion, and instills a common framework of strategy and defense thinking in the security establishment while increasing officers’ grasp of non-military affairs. The complexity of modern military operations and the varied (and usually well-educated) range of people the military can expect to work with make widespread, graduate-level, intellectual training essential.
- Is entry to military schools based on transparent criteria and merit?
- No: There are formal criteria but in practice entry to military schools is heavily influenced by political or communal identities, social profiling, nepotism, or corruption.
- To a limited extent: Entry to military schools is influenced by political or communal identities, social profiling, nepotism, or corruption, but merit is also required.
- To a greater extent: Entry to military schools is sometimes subject to informal factors but largely based on merit.
- Considerably: Entry to military schools is predominantly based on transparent criteria and merit.
- Do officers perceive a connection between military education and career advancement?
- No: Officers generally regard other informal factors (personal, political, or communal ties, nepotism and corruption) as more important than military education in advancing their careers.
- To a limited extent: Officers generally believe military education has only a minimal effect on their career advancement.
- To a greater extent: Officers believe military education is important for their career advancement, but also regard other informal factors as necessary.
- Considerably: Officers believe that military education can significantly advance their careers.
- How much does the military prioritize and invest in higher education for officers, whether at defense colleges, national universities (civilian), or foreign institutions?
- Minimally: The military does not prioritize higher education or invest significant resources for that purpose.
- To some extent: The military invests in some levels of higher education but not others, does not involve civilian institutions, and/or does not utilize opportunities in foreign countries effectively.
- To a greater extent: The military invests in higher education, seeks to involve civilian institutions, and utilizes opportunities in foreign countries, but lacks a comprehensive and integrated approach or has only modest resources.
- Considerably: The military prioritizes higher education and invests significant resources for that purpose.
- Does the military education curriculum inculcate civilian values and respect for civilians and civilian authority?
- No: It does not.
- To some extent: It does so, but this is largely nominal and does not materially affect military attitudes or behavior.
- To a greater extent: It does so, but its effect derives from the wider political culture of the country as much as from intrinsic values and respect.
- Considerably: The military internalizes values and respect for their own worth.
- Is the military education system effective in developing the military’s corporate identity?
- No.
- Limited effectiveness.
- Somewhat effective.
- Highly effective.
- Is assistance sought from non-military institutions and experts in designing and delivering military education courses?
- No, it is not.
- Some assistance is sought, but this is not well institutionalized or routinized.
- Assistance is sought consistently, but non-military institutions and experts are not utilized to their full potential.
- Yes, there is a high level of involvement and integration of non-military institutions and experts.
- Do senior military officers and civilian officials who occupy policy level positions in their respective ministries attend joint national defense courses?
- No, they do not.
- They rarely do, and there is no national institute providing joint courses.
- They attend courses abroad, as there is no national institute providing joint courses.
- Yes, consistently, there is a national institute providing joint courses.
- Does military education provide a range of specializations at various levels that enable the armed forces to compete with civilian employers in attracting skilled personnel, and that equip military personnel with recognized qualifications and transferable skills they can use once they return to civilian life?
- No: Military education does not provide relevant training or skills at officer or noncommissioned officer level and is not designed to do so.
- To some extent: Military education provides some specializations but offers few or no competitive advantages or transferable skills.
- To a greater extent: Military education is effective in some specializations at officer level, but the military does not prioritize designing or funding programs for developing transferable skills at noncommissioned level.
- Considerably: Military education provides a range of specializations at various levels and transferable skills, through dedicated and funded programs.
